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Safeguarding Schools: Drug-Free School
Zone Acts in the Legal Arena
Ryan J. Fleming*
I.

Introduction

In October of 1998, David Drummond sat on his bed as police, in
possession of a search warrant, climbed Drummond's fire escape and
entered his apartment.' The police quickly placed Drummond in custody
and searched his apartment, finding Ziploc packets and clear bags of
cocaine, empty Ziploc bags, and $280 in cash, on or near Drummond, all
within plain view. 2 Drummond's apartment was located only 587 feet
from the St. Rose of Lima School.3 Drummond was convicted of
possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, and sentenced
to two- to four-years imprisonment.
At first glance, Drummond's conviction and sentencing appear as
unremarkable as any of the hundreds of daily arrests for drug violations.
One facet of Drummond's incarceration, however, places Drummond's
conviction in a developing legal arena; Drummond received a heightened
sentence under Pennsylvania's drug free school zone act.5 The act
imposes a minimum sentence of two- to four-years total confinement for
any delivery of or possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance
within 1000 feet of a public, private, or parochial school, college or
university. 6 Although Drummond was in his apartment, which was
inaccessible to children, the statute ensured that he would receive a
harsher penalty because of the threat that his wares posed.
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University, 2003; B.A., The University of Maryland at College Park, 1998. The author
would like to thank Diana A. Clancy and his family for their love and support throughout
the writing of this comment.
1. See Commonwealth v. Drummond, 2001 PA Super. 122, 3, 775 A.2d 849, 851
(2001).
2. See id.
3. See id. 3 n.5, 775 A.2d at 851 n.5.
4. See id. 3,775 A.2d at 851.
5. See id; see also 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6317 (2001).
6. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6317(A).
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Drummond appealed his conviction on the grounds that the court
erred in applying the act.7 His appeal was one of the latest attacks on
what has become a much-challenged legislative entity: the drug-free
school zone act. The typical school zone act is based loosely on the
federal drug-free school zone act. 8 The federal statute ("Federal Act")
doubles the minimum punishment for distribution of, possession with
intent to distribute, or manufacture of controlled substances if the offense
feet of a school or other area likely to be
is committed within 1000
9
frequented by children.
Offenders have subjected school zone acts to a variety of legal
However, courts have unanimously rejected these
challenges.10
challenges, upholding the validity of the challenged acts. This comment
will examine the ceaseless strength of school zone acts, the challenges
that have been levied against them, and why the acts are so important. It
will also identify why courts should continue to uphold the acts, and why
state legislatures should push for even stricter penalties for offenders
caught selling drugs in school zones.
II.

Background

A.

The Necessity of School Zone Acts

To the dismay of teachers, parents, and law enforcement officials,
narcotics have become a fixture of American society. The government
has responded accordingly; federal drug control spending rose from
roughly $1.5 billion in 1981 to $17.9 billion in 1999 according to a
recent study by the Schneider Institute of Health Policy." Drug use
among young adults continues to rise despite the increasing

5, 775 A.2d at 852; see also text
7. See Drummond, 2001 PA Super.
accompanying notes 45-62 (including detailed discussion of Drummond).
8. See 21 U.S.C. § 860 (2001) (originally codified at 21 U.S.C. § 845a (1985)).
Although states do not always specifically name the drug-free school zone acts as such,
hereinafter they shall be referred to as school zone acts.
9. See 21 U.S.C. § 860(a); see also 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (outlining penalties for
various drug-related offenses).
10. See State v. Swafford, 890 P.2d 368 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995) (rejecting school zone
act challenge based on argument that prosecution must 'show that defendant was aware
that sale occurred within 1000 feet of a school); Commonwealth v. Taylor, 596 N.E.2d
333 (Mass. 1992) (rejecting challenge based on argument that statute was void for
vagueness); Dawson v. State, 619 A.2d 111 (Md. 1993) (rejecting challenge based on
argument that no children were in school zone at time of drug sale); Drummond, 2001 PA
Super. 122, 775 A.2d 849 (rejecting challenge based on argument that children had no
access to the defendant's apartment).
11. See CONSTANCE HORGAN ET AL., SUBSTANCE ABUSE: THE NATION'S NUMBER
ONE HEALTH PROBLEM 85 (Jane J. Stein ed., 2001).
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expenditures. 2 Weekly and monthly use of marijuana by all persons
over twelve years of age rose from 4.9 million and 8.2 million,
respectively, in 1992 to 6.8 million and 10.5 million, respectively, in
1998.13 The number of high school students reporting having used
marijuana or cocaine rose from 31.3% and 5.9%, respectively, in 1991,
to 47.2% and 9.5%, respectively, in 1999.14 Additionally, while the total
crime index for offenders under the age of eighteen dropped by 20.5%
from 1990 to 1999, the number of drug abuse violations among the same
group increased by a startling 132.2% over the same time period. 5
Although levels of drug use among youths have declined from their6
peaks in the mid-1990s, they remain above levels of the early-1990s.1
Studies show that significant changes in drug awareness take place
between the ages of twelve and thirteen;' 7 accordingly, it is imperative
that regulations be enacted to eliminate children's access to drugs. The
first place to start is in schools.
B.

The FederalStatute

The Federal Act was originally introduced in 197018 in a far
different form than it appears today. Currently the statute states that any
person who distributes, possesses with intent to distribute, or
manufactures a controlled substance within 1000 feet of a school,
college, or playground, or within 100 feet of a youth center, swimming
pool, or video arcade, is subject to twice the maximum punishment for
those crimes outside of a school zone,. and at least twice any term of
supervised release. 19 The language of the Federal Act was not
significantly strengthened until amendment in 1986.20 That amendment
added language to the Federal Act that expanded its coverage from
elementary and secondary schools to include vocational schools,

12.
13.
14.

See generally id.
See id. at 35.
See NAT'L CTR. FOR CHRONIC

DISEASE PREVENTION & HEALTH PROMOTION, U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., YOUTH RISK BEHAVIOR SURVEY: 1999 (2000),

availableat http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp//dash/yrbs /trend.htm.
15. See SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS: 2000, at 361 tbl. 4.6 (2001),
availableat http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/1995/pdf/t46.pdf.
16. See HORGAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 14.
17. See id. at 28 ("Thirteen-year-olds are three times as likely to know how to obtain
marijuana or to know someone who uses illicit drugs than are 12-year-olds.").
18. See Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-513, § 419, 84 Stat. 4566, 4595-96 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 860
(2001)).
19. See 21 U.S.C. § 860(a) (2001).
20. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, §§ 1004(a), 1104,
1105(c), 1841(b), 1866(b)-(c), 100 Stat. 3207-6, 3207-11, 3207, 3207-52, 3207-55.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 107:2

colleges, junior colleges, and universities. 2 ' Additionally, a 1988
amendment added language expanding the Federal Act to include areas
within 100 feet of playgrounds, youth centers, swimming pools, and
video arcades. 22 These amendments broadened the reach of the statute
and evinced Congress's intent to criminalize drug activities not only in
schools, but also in other areas where children are likely to be present.
The Federal Act functions as a sentence enhancer. 23 The statute
enhances the penalties for violations of 21 U.S.C. § 841.24 Subsection
(b) of section 841 imposes a minimum sentence of ten years for the
manufacture of, distribution of, or possession with intent to manufacture
or distribute marijuana, cocaine, heroin, or other drugs in large
quantities. 25 That subsection also allows for a maximum fine not to
exceed the greater of that authorized by title 18 of the United States Code
or $4,000,000.26 For second offenses, the Federal Act imposes a
minimum sentence of twenty years or a maximum fine of $8,000,000.27
The subsection imposes a minimum sentence of five years, or a fine of
28
$2,000,000, for the possession of lesser amounts of the listed drugs.
For second offenses involving those smaller quantities, the statute
imposes a minimum sentence of ten years or a fine of $4,000,000.29 By
doubling these delineated penalties, the Federal Act ensures harsher
penalties for individuals who commit their crimes within areas proximate
to schools.
C.

The State Statutes

Congress's creation of legislation to enhance existing drug penalties
increased federal efforts to eradicate the drug trade from the lives of its
most vulnerable targets. States soon followed. The basic language of
state school zone acts is typically modeled on the Federal Act. State
school zone acts usually impose some form of increased penalty for
21. See id.
22. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, §§ 6452(b)(1), 64576458, 102 Stat. 4371, 4373.
23. Regardless of the seeming simplicity of the statute as nothing more than a
sentence enhancer, some courts have found that the statute actually created a separate
range of crimes. See, e.g., United States v. Chandler, 125 F.3d 892 (5th Cir. 1997).
24. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2001).
25. See id. § 841(b)(1)(A)(i)-(vii) (imposing minimum ten-year penalty for
possession of one kilogram of heroin, five kilograms of cocaine, 100 grams of PCP, ten
grams of LSD, 1000 kilograms of marijuana, etc.).
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See id. § 841(b)(1)(B) (imposing minimum five-year penalty for possession of
100 grams of heroin, 500 grams of cocaine, ten grams of PCP, one gram of LSD, 100
grams of marijuana, etc.).
29. See id.
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possession or distribution of drugs within 1000 feet of a school or a few
hundred feet of a playground, video arcade, or other area likely to attract
children. Curiously, however, most of the state statutes impose penalties
far milder than their federal counterpart.
The Pennsylvania school zone act contains language quite similar to
that of the federal statute. 30 The statute provides a minimum sentence of
two years and a maximum sentence of four years for delivery of or
possession with intent to deliver any controlled substance if the
prohibited action occurred within 1000 feet of a school, college, or
university, within 250 feet of a recreation center or playground, or on a
school bus. 31 Although the statute does provide for harsher penalties if
the court finds that there was intent to deliver to an individual under the
age of eighteen years,3 2 the penalties imposed do not match those of the
Federal Act.
Similarly, under Maryland's former school zone act, an individual
who manufactures, distributes, or possesses with intent to distribute a
controlled substance within 1000 feet of a school or school board or on a
school vehicle faces a maximum penalty of twenty-years imprisonment
or a maximum fine of $20,000 (or both) for a first offense, or a minimum
sentence of five- to forty-years imprisonment or a $40,000 fine (or both)
for a second offense. 33 It is important to note, however, that the
Maryland statute includes language that addresses a particular challenge
that has been brought in Maryland, as well as in states that have not
enacted such clearly written statutes.3 4 The Maryland statute specifically
states that the penalty for distribution in a school zone is enhanced
regardless of whether school was in session at the time of the crime, or
whether the property was being used for activities other than for school
purposes at the time.35 Regardless of the specificity with which the act
was written, however, the Maryland statute contains penalties that are
weak in comparison with those of the Federal Act.
An even shorter minimum penalty is assigned under the
Massachusetts school zone act. 36 That statute, containing the same
30. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6317 (2001).
31. See id. § 6317(A).
32. See id.
33. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 286D (2001) (repealed 2002). Although
Maryland's school zone act was recently repealed, its construction nonetheless serves as
an excellent example of effective school zone legislation.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 73-87 (discussing Dawson v. State, 619 A.2d
111 (Md. 1993)); see also State v. Jenkins, 15 S.W.3d 914, 918 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999)
(rejecting defendant's challenge of his conviction on grounds that Tennessee legislature
made no indication in writing Tennessee school zone act that the act should apply only
during school hours).
35. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 286D(a)(i)-(ii) (repealed 2002).
36. See MASS GEN. LAWS ch. 94C, § 32J (2001).
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geographic limitations as the Federal Act for distance from a school or
playground, imposes a minimum sentence of two years in a correctional
facility for a drug crime in a school zone.37
One of the most illogically written school zone acts is that of
California.3 8 The California statute states that, when the drug offense
occurs within 1000 feet of an elementary, vocational, junior high, or high
school, the offender shall receive an increased penalty of three, four, or
five years (left to the court's discretion). 39 However, the statute requires
that the crime occur during hours that the school is open for classes or
school-related programs, or at any time when minors are using the
facility, for the statute to apply. 40 In drafting its school zone act in such a
fashion, the California legislature contravened the intent of at least one
other state legislature, which enacted a school zone act that applies to the
school zone regardless of whether children are present at the time of the
crime.4 1 California has stated instead that children must be present at the
time that the transaction occurs; otherwise, the statute does not apply and
no harsher penalty is meted out. Additionally, the state's requirement of
a discretionary decision by the court to impose a minimum of three-years
imprisonment falls short of the federal standard.
Not all states impose such watered-down versions of the Federal
Act. Texas's school zone act, for example, imposes increased grades of
offenses, from third- or second-degree felonies to first-degree felonies,
for drug offenses committed within 1000 feet of a school, or 300 feet of a
youth center, swimming pool, or video arcade.42 The Texas statute
increases the minimum confinement by five years, and doubles the
maximum fine for non-school zone drug vioiations.43 Although Texas
does impose a penalty for school zone violations that is somewhat
stricter than those of other states, it is still weaker than the Federal Act.
The fact that states have enacted school zone acts is reassuring
when considering the increase in drug use by youths in recent years. It is
troubling, however, that most state statutes do not impose penalties as
severe as those of the Federal Act. In light of the increased drug use by
children, a legislative initiative aimed at curbing such use by limiting
37. See id.
38. See CAL. HEALTH& SAFETY CODE § 11353.6 (Deering 2001).
39. Seeid. § 11353.6(b).
40. See id.
41. See Dawson v. State, 619 A.2d 111, 117 (Md. 1993) ("The General Assembly
established the 'drug-free zones' as a prophylactic device aimed at protecting children on
or near school property ... the application of [the statute] to all transactions within the
1,000 foot perimeter, regardlessof the presence of children, is substantially related to this
goal.") (emphasis added).
42. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.134 (Vernon 2000).
43. See id. § 481.134(c).
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trafficking and its resulting negative effects on children should fully be
utilized. But a statute with no teeth, such as the California statute, which
has no effect on drug dealers if their activities occur at night, cannot
possibly serve as a deterrent. A valuable weapon in the drug war is lost
if states do not enact effective school zone acts. More states must enact
statutes modeled on Maryland's recently-repealed school zone act, which
included specific language identifying the intent of the legislature to
apply the statute to all situations on school grounds, regardless of the
presence of children. Without clear, concise statutes, defendants will
always be willing and able to challenge the language of school zone acts.
III. Analysis of Legal Challenges
Challenges to school zone acts have come in a variety of forms.
While some challenges have shown creativity or potential for validity,
the courts have inevitably dismissed all challenges. This section will
analyze a number of legal challenges to school zone acts and courts'
responses.
The introduction of this comment introduced a recent Pennsylvania
case, Commonwealth v. Drummond.4 In Drummond, the police entered
Drummond's apartment pursuant to a search warrant and placed him in
custody before discovering several baggies containing cocaine and $280
in cash, all within the vicinity of where Drummond had been sitting
when police entered the apartment. 45 Drummond's apartment was
located 587 feet from the St. Rose of Lima School.46 Drummond was
convicted of possession of a controlled substance with intent to
distribute 47 and sentenced to two- to four-years imprisonment under the
Pennsylvania school zone act.48
Drummond challenged his conviction, claiming that the trial court
erred by sentencing him pursuant to Pennsylvania's school zone act.49
Specifically, Drummond challenged the court's application of the school
zone act to him because his residence was not open to the general public,
particularly children, despite the location of his apartment and its
proximity to a school.5 °
When the Pennsylvania Superior Court decided Drummond, it also
decided a companion case, Commonwealth v. Hinds.5' In Hinds, police
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

2001 PA Super. 122, 775 A.2d 849 (2001).
See id. 3,775 A.2d at 851.
See id. 3 n.5, 775 A.2d at 851 n.5.
See id. 3, 775 A.2d at 851 (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6317 (2001)).
See id. 3,775 A.2d at 851.
See id. 5, 775 A.2d at 852.
See id. 14, 775 A.2d at 855.
2001 PA Super. 121, 775 A.2d 859 (2001).
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executed a search warrant of Hinds's apartment and discovered 5.97
grams of crack cocaine, four Ziploc packets of marijuana, drug
paraphernalia and two guns.5 2 The jury convicted Hinds and the court
sentenced him under the Pennsylvania school zone act to an aggregate of
five- to ten-years imprisonment, including the mandatory sentence
imposed by section 7508 of the Pennsylvania school zone act,53 but did
not apply section 6317.54 The Commonwealth appealed the issue of
whether the trial court erred in failing to adopt the mandatory two-year
sentence of the Pennsylvania school zone act.55
In both cases the court dismissed the argument that the school zone
act did not apply because no minor was involved in the actual offense
with which the defendants were charged.56 The court relied on the
reasoning of Commonwealth v. Campbell,57 which held that, in enacting
section 6317, the Pennsylvania legislature intended to protect children
from the evils of drug use not only on school grounds or buses, but also
in other areas where children were likely to be present, such as
playgrounds or recreation centers.58 The court found that section 6317
was intended to protect children from harms attendant to the drug trade
and that such harms are present when an individual intending to sell
drugs merely resides within 1000 feet of a school, regardless of whether
the drugs are accessible to children. 59 The court stated that finding
otherwise would emasculate the meaning of a "drug-free school zone. 6 °
In both61cases, the court found that application of section 6317 was
proper.
Similarly, in another decision strengthening school zone acts against
attack from criminals, the Kansas Court of Appeals found that a drug
dealer may be punished under a school zone act even if he is not aware
of his location within a school zone. 62 In State v. Swafford,63 Swafford
52. See id. 2, 775 A.2d at 860.
53. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7508 (2001).
54. See Hinds, 2001 PA Super.
3, 775 A.2d at 860; see also supra text
accompanying notes 30-32 (discussing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6317).
55. See Hinds, 2001 PA Super. 4, 775 A.2d at 860; see also 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §
6317.
56. See Commonwealth v. Drummond, 2001 PA Super. 122, 15, 775 A.2d at 857
(2001); Hinds, 2001 PA Super. 7, 775 A.2d at 861.
57. 2001 PA Super. 251, 758 A.2d 1231 (2000).
58. See Drummond, 2001 PA Super. 15, 775 A.2d at 856; Hinds, 2001 PA Super.
7, 775 A.2d at 862.
59. See Drummond, 2001 PA Super. 15, 775 A.2d at 857; Hinds, 2001 PA Super.
7, 775 A.2d at 863.
60. See Drummond, 2001 PA Super. 15, 775 A.2d at 857; Hinds, 2001 PA Super.
7, 775 A.2d at 863.
61. See Drummond, 2001 PA Super. 19, 775 A.2d at 858; Hinds, 2001 PA Super.
9, 775 A.2d at 863.
62. See State v. Swafford, 890 P.2d 368 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995).
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was convicted under the Kansas school zone act of selling rock cocaine
to a police informant whose apartment was within 1000 feet of a
school. 64
Swafford challenged his conviction on the ground that knowledge
that the sale occurred within 1000 feet of a school is an essential element
of the crime.65 The court examined the language of the statute and
concluded that the Kansas legislature did not intend for the school zone
act to require the defendant to know that he was within 1000 feet of a
school in order to be effective. 66 The court found that the purpose of the
school zone act was to protect children from drug use and the negative
situations that accompany it.67 The court reasoned that children would
be exposed to these negative influences when individuals deal drugs near
schools regardless of whether the dealers are aware of their proximity to
the schools. 68 Additionally, the court found that requiring proof of a
defendant's knowledge of his presence within a school zone at the time
of the sale would place an arduous burden on police and prosecutors and
would contravene the clear purpose of the statute. 69 The court affirmed
the conviction.70
The decisions of the courts in Drummond, Hinds, and Swafford
present an important element for creating an effective school zone act.
In all three cases, the courts looked to the intent of the legislature, as
expressed through the language of the school zone acts, to determine the
effectiveness of the acts. If future courts scrutinize the language of the
acts, the clarity of the school zone acts as enacted by state legislatures
will determine the effectiveness of the acts in safeguarding children from
the dangers of drug use. In addition to delineating clearly acts that are
effective regardless of children's access to the place of sale or
defendants' knowledge that they were in a drug zone at the time of the
sale, legislatures must signal (and courts must recognize) the importance
of making school zone acts effective twenty-four hours a day. By
illuminating this component of the Pennsylvania statute, the court in
Drummond and Hinds illustrated a legislative intent not simply to keep
drugs away from children, but to keep all dangers attendant to drugs
away from children.7' Similarly, the court in Swafford recognized the
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

71.

See Commonwealth v. Drummond, 2001 PA Super. 122,

id. at 371 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4161(d) (2000)).
id.
id. at 371-72.
id. at 372.
id.
id.
id. at 374.

857 (2001); Commonwealth v. Hinds, 2001 PA Super. 121,

15, 775 A.2d 849,

7, 775 A.2d 859, 863
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negative influence of these dangers on children, and indicated that a
dealer's knowledge is irrelevant to such influence.72
Although dealers clearly can no longer challenge their convictions
under a school zone act because of their lack of knowledge that they
were in a drug-free school zone at the time of the offense, offenders are
left with a potential loophole if school zone acts do not provide for
round-the-clock effectiveness. Fortunately, courts have recognized the
legislative intent of removing the threats of the drug trade from schools
at all hours, but challenges to the time of arrest have arisen.
In Dawson v. State,73 undercover officers approached Dawson at
9:30 p.m. within 1000 feet of Halls Cross Elementary School and
inquired about purchasing cocaine.74 Dawson sold the officers a small
packet of cocaine for $25 and stated that he was routinely in that area and
that the officers should look for him'again if they needed more cocaine."
Dawson was arrested and convicted of unlawful distribution of a
controlled dangerous substance and unlawful distribution of a controlled
dangerous substance within 1000 77feet of a school,76 a violation falling
under Maryland's school zone act.
Dawson appealed his conviction, arguing that application of the
Maryland school zone act violated the Due Process Clause of the United
States Constitution and the Maryland Declaration of Rights. 78 He argued
that there was no "real and substantial" relationship between the
Maryland legislature's objective of protecting schoolchildren and the
school zone act's imposition of liability regardless of the presence of
children at the time of the crime. 79 Dawson argued that the legislative
purpose of protecting children was not
served by applying the statute at
80
times when children were not present.
The Dawson court found that it was not the Maryland legislature's
intent to stop only the use of drugs by school-age children, but also to
limit children's exposure to the violent crime and demoralizing
environment that are an inevitable consequence of the drug trade. 81 The
court dismissed Dawson's argument that the school zone act was too
broad and found that the act was intended as a prophylactic measure to
(2001).
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

See 890 P.2d at 372.
619 A.2d 111 (Md. 1993).
See id at 113.
See id.
See id at 114.
See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 286D (2001) (repealed 2002).
See Dawson, 619 A.2d at 114.
Id. at 115.
See id.
See id.
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halt drug activity and its attendant evils in even those areas that, although
labeled as "school areas," are not frequented by students solely during
school hours.82 The court recognized that the Maryland legislature did
not intend merely to regulate the business hours of those trading in drugs,
but to eliminate those individuals from schools altogether. 83 The easiest
way to do so was to make dealers aware that dealing drugs in school
areas will result in penalties drastically outweighing any possible
benefits to the dealers, regardless of the hour.84 The court found the
Maryland school zone act to be rationally related to the goal of protecting
schoolchildren, noting that due process does not "require that the means
chosen [by the legislature] to deal with a problem score a notable success
in every application of the statute., 85 Finally, the court noted that in its
research every court reviewing school zone acts had found them to be
constitutional.8 6
The decision in Dawson is illustrative of how legislatures and courts
should strive to create and interpret school zone acts. Although it is
important that the Maryland Court of Appeals recognized the
significance of applying the Maryland school zone act around the clock,
regardless of the presence of children, the Maryland legislature took an
important initial step when it enacted the school zone act. The
legislature included the language that states that the act shall apply
regardless of whether school is in session at the time of the offense, or
whether the school property is being used for school purposes at the time
of the offense.87 That language cuts down the amount of judicial
guesswork necessitated by less-clear statutes.
Some courts, however, are willing to take a clearly written statute
and infer a legislative intent, even in the absence of specific words in the
legislation to support their interpretation. In Morse v. State,88 Morse was
found guilty of dealing cocaine within 1000 feet of a school under the
Indiana school zone act; the statute had no language pertaining to
whether the school was open at the time of arrest.89 Morse challenged
the statute as unconstitutional because it did not require children to be
present at the time of the crime. 90 The court dismissed Morse's
challenge, stating that it could easily presume that the legislature
82.
83.
84.
85.
1985)).
86.

87.
88.
89.
90.

See id. at 116.
See id. at 116-17.
See id.
See id. at 117 (quoting United States v. Agilar, 779 F.2d 123, 125 (2d Cir.
See id. at 118.
See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,

§ 286D(a)(1)(i)-(ii) (2001).
593 N.E.2d 194 (Ind. 1992).
See id.
at 195; see also IND. CODE § 35-48-4-2(b)(2)(B)(i) (2002).
See Morse, 593 N.E.2d at 197.
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recognized that school premises are not occupied solely during school
hours, but are also gathering places for children outside of school
hours. 9' The Morse court concluded by noting that the legislature was
justified in that presumption as well as in its intention not to require
proof of the presence of children for conviction under the statute.92
Some comfort may be taken in the Morse court's extrapolation of a
legislative intent to strike down an offender's challenge of a school zone
act as unconstitutional. The decision in Morse, however, is no guarantee
that other courts will not abide strictly by the language of the school zone
act, choosing to uphold a similar challenge if language pertaining to time
is not present in the statute.
It would seem that a far more secure approach for a state legislature
to take is to follow the lead of Massachusetts, whose school zone act
states that any person who delivers dangerous substances within 1000
feet of a school, "whether or not in session," may be sentenced to a
mandatory minimum sentence of two years.93 The clarity of that statute
allowed the Appeals Court of Massachusetts, in Commonwealth v.
Hernandez,94. to dispense expeditiously with Hernandez's challenge of
the statute. 95 Hernandez challenged the statute on the grounds that the
area where he was arrested did not meet the definition of a "school"
because school was not in session at the time of his arrest, and, thus, the
statute did not apply. 96 The court relied on the clarity of the statute to
hold that, because the statute states that school does not have to be in
97
session at the time of the incident, Hernandez's claim was groundless.
Lack of clarity in statutes may also allow offenders to challenge
school zone acts as overly vague. In Commonwealth v. Taylor9" the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts heard a challenge of the state's school
zone act on the ground of unconstitutional vagueness. In Taylor, a police
officer observed Taylor engaged in what the officer believed to be a drug
sale in a subway station approximately 125 feet from Don Bosco High
School. 99 The officer apprehended and arrested Taylor and found
fourteen packets of marijuana and $221 in cash.100 Taylor was convicted
of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and possession of

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

See id.
See id.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94C, § 32J (2001).
680 N.E.2d 111 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997).
See id.at 116.
See id.
See id
596 N.E.2d 333 (Mass. 1992).
See id. at 334.
See id.
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marijuana with intent to distribute within 1000 feet of a school, 01 the
12
latter charge falling under the Massachusetts school zone act.
Taylor challenged his conviction on the ground that the
Massachusetts school zone act violated his rights under the Due Process
Clause of the United States Constitution because the provision was too
vague and overbroad to be properly enforced. 0 3 Specifically, Taylor
argued that the act did not sufficiently define the specific acts
prohibited.10 4 The court found that the Massachusetts school zone act
was not unconstitutionally vague. 05 The court stated that the act
satisfied the requirements of the "void for vagueness" test in that a
person of average intelligence could understand that it prohibits
possession of drugs with intent to distribute within 1000 feet of a school
police on what is criminal, deterring arbitrary
and that it instructs
06
enforcement.

In a creative claim, Taylor also argued that the act was overbroad
because there was no area within the City of Boston that was not also
within 1000 feet of a school zone. 10 7 Taylor claimed that the increased
proximity to schools in Boston created a discriminatory statute because
anyone in Boston charged with possession with intent to distribute would
be charged under the school zone statute, while dealers outside of Boston
would not be similarly charged. 10 8 The court dismissed the possibility
that inner-city drug dealers might constitute a "suspect class" worthy of
protection, part of the test for equal protection violations. 0 9 The court
noted that other courts have routinely found" 0 that an individual's
increased proximity to a school, regardless of the reason, does not make
him different from other citizens and, therefore, entitled to different
treatment." 1
101. See id.
102. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94C, § 32J (2001).
103. See Taylor, 596 N.E.2d at 336.
104. See id.
105. See id. The court stated that the "void for vagueness" doctrine holds that a
statute must define the offense with sufficient clarity that ordinary people can understand
what is prohibited and in such a manner that it does not encourage arbitrary enforcement.
Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Williams, 479 N.E.2d 687, 688 (Mass. 1985)).
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See id The court treated Taylor's claim as a contention that the statute violates
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or [shall any state] deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
109. See Taylor, 596 N.E.2d at 336 n.8.
110. See United States v. Pitts, 908 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Agilar, 779 F.2d 123, 126 (2d Cir. 1985); Harrison v. State, 560 So. 2d 1124, 1128 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1989).
111. See Taylor, 596 N.E.2d at 337. The court also rejected Taylor's argument on the
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The challenge that Taylor brought is important for two reasons.
First, it illustrates judicial unwillingness to accept equal protection
challenges to school zone acts because of the lack of a class of
individuals suffering disparate treatment. By eliminating the possibility
of offenders claiming that they received treatment in one jurisdiction that
was different from treatment of similar offenders in another jurisdiction,
courts have signaled that the goal of the statutes, protection of children,
is adequately advanced by acts establishing school zones and punishing
1 12
equally those offenders within such zones.
Second, Taylor's challenge is a good example of the creative
lengths to which offenders and their attorneys will go to challenge
sentence-enhancing school zone acts. Taylor stretched the protections of
the Constitution to limits that the court was unwilling to accept by
claiming that he received treatment disparate from what a dealer would
have received in another city. The court in Taylor recognized the
extraordinary value of school zone acts and made clear that they would
have upheld Taylor's conviction even if he had been correct in his claim
that there was no area in Boston that was not within 1000 feet of a
school.11 3 It is imperative that courts continue to recognize the value of
school zone acts in the face of challenges brought by offenders and their
attorneys.
Finally, while this comment has focused thus far on challenges to
state school zone acts, challenges to the Federal Act are common as well.
One case, United States v. Cross, 1 4 involved a number of the abovementioned challenges applied to 21 U.S.C. § 845 (the precursor to the
modem Federal Act). 115 In that case, Cross was found guilty of seven
counts of distribution of cocaine, five of which occurred within 1000 feet
6
of a school, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 845a."
Cross appealed his conviction under the Federal Act on the ground
that section 845a violated the Equal Protection Clause because it lacked a
rational relation to Congress's purpose and was, therefore, both over- and
under-inclusive." 7 Cross argued that, as written, section 845a did not
apply to drug deals in non-school areas even though the danger was no

ground that there was no evidence that there was no location within the City of Boston
that was not also within 1000 feet of a school. See id. at 336.
112. See id. at 337.
113. See supra note 110 (outlining cases the court cited finding possibility of
disparate treatment of dealers to be unpersuasive as basis for striking down school zone
acts).
114. 900 F.2d 66 (6th Cir. 1990).
115. See 21 U.S.C. § 860 (2001).
116. See Cross, 900 F.2d at 67.
117. See id. at 68.
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less prevalent."18 Additionally, Cross claimed that the section unfairly
applied to transactions that took place completely in private between
119
adults if the transactions occurred within 1000 feet of a school.
1 20
rejected the underThe court, citing United States v. Holland,
inclusiveness argument by finding that equal protection does not require
that Congress legislate against every possible situation where drugs may
be sold in the presence of children.' 2' Rejecting the over-inclusiveness
argument, the court found that the purpose of the statute is not simply to
eliminate drugs from schools, but also to remove the dangerous
circumstances surrounding the drug trade. 12 2 The court found that the
in
statute promotes this ideal by punishing offenders caught dealing
23
school.1
a
of
feet
1000
within
but
children,
from
away
homes
private
Cross then argued that section 845a violated due process by
establishing an irrebuttable and irrational presumption of guilt in that the
sale of drugs within 1000 feet of a school necessitates a punishment
greater than punishments given for the same crimes outside of a school
zone.1 24 He alleged that such greater punishments were not appropriate
where the defendant harbored no intent to sell to children. 125 The court
rejected this argument and stated that the statute does not presume guilt
but, rather, increases punishment where a particular set of facts is found
to be present.' 26 Therefore,127there was no irrational presumption of guilt
in violation of due process.
Finally, Cross claimed that section 845a violated due process
because it included no mens rea requirement that the defendant be aware
that the drug transaction occurred within 1000 feet of a school. 28 Cross,
who relied upon Liparota v. United States,129 argued that when a statute's
purpose is unclear it should be resolved in favor of leniency and that,
because section 845a was unclear, in the interest of leniency, knowledge
of the proximity of the drug transaction to a school must be regarded as
30
an element of the crime that the prosecution must prove.
The court rejected the argument that knowledge was an element to
be proven by the prosecution on the ground that the purpose of the
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

See id
See id.
810 F.2d 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
See Cross, 900 F.2d at 68.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
471 U.S. 419 (1985).
See Cross, 900 F.2d at 69.
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statute is clear: deterrence of drug distribution around schools.' 31 The
court also agreed with the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in United
States v. Falu,3 2 which held that section 845a only applies to persons
who have violated 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), which contains a mens rea
component requiring that the defendant knowingly or intentionally
distributed a dangerous substance.' 3 3 The court stated that applying the
rule of leniency to offenders caught dealing in school zones would
disrupt the clear intent of Congress that those individuals bear the burden
of ascertaining proximity35to schools. 34 Based on that finding, the court
affirmed the conviction.'
The Cross decision illustrates a federal court's rejection of a number
of challenges to the Federal Act. Like most state courts, the federal court
chose to place the safety of children above the alleged violations of the
defendant's rights. From the local courts to the federal courts, judicial
action uniformly verifies the importance of school zone acts. Although
the state acts may lack some of the force of the Federal Act, courts
support school zone acts, and, consequently, challenges to them have
become unlikely to succeed. The question left to be asked is why courts
so overwhelmingly support school zone acts and how the judicial attitude
toward the acts can be utilized to increase the severity and effectiveness
of state school zone acts.
IV. Judicial Support for School Zone Acts
Regardless of the favorable stance that this comment takes toward
school zone acts, there is arguably some merit to attacks on school zone
acts as unconstitutional, at least as far as their. regulation of drug sales
within private homes. The government's heightened regulation of a
private, purely adult-oriented, albeit illegal, activity, would appear to
present a question of infringement on individual rights when that
limitation is based upon the activity's influence on children. As at least
one judge has found, the police power is finite, limited to the legislative
objective enacted. 36 Enhancing sentences of dealers caught selling their
wares in their homes, which happen to be within 1000 feet of a school,
could be construed to lack a reasonable relationship with the legislative
intent of removing drugs from schools. 137 Yet the courts have not failed
131. See id.
132. 776 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1985).
133. See Cross, 900 F.2d at 69.
134. See id.
135. See id at 70.
136. See Commonwealth v. Hinds, 2001 PA Super. 121,
67 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
137. See id. 1, 775 A.2d at 864 (Johnson, J., dissenting).

1-9, 775 A.2d 859, 863-
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to condemn harshly attacks on school zone acts by defendants.
The reasons for judicial support of school zone acts are
straightforward and have been laid out by the various opinions
mentioned in this comment, as well as in many other cases involving
challenges to school zone acts. First, judges generally place the
protection of children above other interests and pursue this protection
through the deterrent effect of school zone acts. 138 By interpreting the
legislative intent of school zone acts to be the protection of children from
the ravages of drugs and their attendant debilitating consequences, courts
have indicated that decisions regarding school zone acts will be made in
favor of the protection of children, not the rights of dealers.
Courts have, in fact, indicated that school zone acts, as written, are
intended to place a higher burden on dealers than on prosecutors, police,
and courts.1 3 9 Individuals who choose to conduct their operations within
school zones will be forced to evaluate their decision to do so, and, if
they choose to continue operating in such fashion, those individuals-not
the courts or the police-will face the consequences. Judges have
signaled that prosecutors will not have to prove that the defendant knew
that he was within a school zone, 140 making all the more foolish a
dealer's decision to sell near a school.
The clarity of the enacted statutes has eased the courts'
interpretations of individual school zone acts. Courts have uniformly
found school zone acts to be clearly opposed to dealers' attempts to
defend themselves through claims of persecution.
The fact that some
state statutes do not include elements providing for swifter and harsher
punishment does not lessen this clarity of purpose. 142 This precision of
construction simplifies courts' decisions to uphold school zone acts
138. See State v. Swafford, 890 P.2d 368, 372 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995); see also Dawson
v. State, 619 A.2d 111, 117 (Md. 1993) (stating that Maryland school zone act is
designed to "deter the seller and other illicit dealers from conducting their operations near
school property in the future") (quoting United States v. Nieves, 608 F. Supp. 1147,
1149-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)); Hinds, 2001 PA Super. 6, 775 A.2d at 862.
139. See Swafford, 890 P.2d at 372 ("Congress evidently intended that dealers...
bear the burden of ascertaining where schools are located and removing their operations
from those areas or else face enhanced penalties.") (quoting United States v. Falu, 776
F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 1985)); see also United States v. Cross, 900 F.2d 66, 69 (6th Cir.
1990).
140. See Cross, 900 F.2d at 69 (stating that defendant's knowledge of the proximity
to school is not an element that must be proven by prosecution).
141. See Commonwealth v. Taylor, 596 N.E.2d 333, 336 (Mass. 1992) ("Courts
which have considered the question have consistently found drug-free school zone
provisions not to be unconstitutionally vague."); see also Cross, 900 F.2d at 69 (finding
that the intent of Congress in enacting the Federal Act was clear in not requiring mens rea
for successful prosecution of dealers within school zones).
142. See supra text accompanying notes 38-41 (discussing California school zone
act).
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against all challenges.
Clarity of construction has also allowed courts easily to determine
that school zone acts are rationally related to legislatures' goal of
protecting children from drugs. 143 Additionally, courts have found that
fair application of school zone acts to all offenders eliminates the
possibility of uneven application and, resultingly, of due process
challenges. 144 Even and fair application of a clearly written statute,
rationally related to the legislative purpose it was created to pursue,
insulates school zone acts from attacks by defendants on due process,
equal protection, and other grounds, and has led to unlimited support
from the courts. 145
The construct of school zone acts as sentence enhancers, which
merely add to the punishment of individuals already determined to be
guilty, also aids courts in deciding to support the acts. Criminals affected
by school zone acts have been adjudicated guilty of one crime,
distribution of controlled dangerous substances, when the school zone
acts come into effect. 146 A judge should have little sympathy for a
convicted drug dealer attempting to claim entitlement to relief from a
clearly constructed sentence enhancer for the crime of which the dealer
has previously been found guilty. For judges, it is simply a matter of
applying a legislatively/ enacted mandate to an individual already
determined to be guilty.
Finally, although it may seem to be an example of circular
reasoning, the fact that so many courts have supported school zone acts
indicates that future courts will support them as well. 147 It is hard to
imagine that any future challenges to school zone acts will succeed in
light of the lopsided judicial record that has developed on such
challenges. Courts recognize the extraordinary role that the acts play in

143. See Dawson, 619 A.2d at 117 (finding that "the application of [Maryland's
school zone act] to all transactions within the 1,000 foot perimeter [of schools],
regardless of the presence of children, is substantially related to this goal [of protecting
children on school property]"); see also Cross, 900 F.2d at 69; Morse v. State, 593
N.E.2d 194, 197 (Ind. 1992).
144. See Taylor, 596 N.E.2d at 337 ("[The Massachusetts school zone act] does not
discriminate against any group; it furthers a legitimate State interest of protecting
children and adolescents by establishing a drugfree [sic] school zone and treats those who
would disobey the law within the zone equally.").
145. See Dawson, 619 A.2d at 118 ("We also note that our research has indicated that
every court reviewing drug-free school zone statutes has found them to be
constitutional.").
146. See Cross, 900 F.2d at 69 ("[The Federal Act] does not criminalize otherwise
innocent activity, for the statute applies only to persons who have violated 21 U.S.C. §
841(a)(1)."); see also Taylor, 596 N.E.2d at 337 (rejecting defendant's attempt to have
court recognize drug dealers as "suspect class" worthy of special protection).
147. See supra note 145.
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the protection of children, and, therefore, future courts will continue to
uphold the acts. Although it is unrealistic to expect convicted offenders
to halt their attempts to circumvent the penalties assigned by school zone
acts, it is quite realistic to expect that courts will continue to reject these
attacks for as long as they may persist.
V.

Conclusion

Drug-free school zone acts remain an effective tool to safeguard
children from drugs. Although the plight of drug use among children
continues unabated, with increased support of school zone acts, it may be
possible to at least keep drugs out of schools. Removing drugs from
schools could drastically reduce drug use in America by limiting
children's exposure to drugs. By limiting children's introduction to
narcotics, the drug use that has reached epidemic proportions could be
stopped in its tracks. However, change cannot occur through judicial
action alone. State legislatures must create school zone acts that are
effective around the clock, regardless of the presence of children.
Penalties must be increased to levels comparable to those of the Federal
Act. School zone acts need real teeth in order to be the deterrent that
they were created to be. While courts have shown their ceaseless support
for school zone acts, the courts may only act within the parameters of the
law. It is up to the state legislatures to give the courts the weapons to
continue the fight.

